Tuesday, September 24, 2013

Rand Paper


   
On the Queer Farm: The Rural Challenge to Rhetoric’s Urban Conceit
Erin J. Rand, Syracuse University

Beginning with the farmer as a figure of rhetoric opens up possibilities for imagining the generative, reproductive, but also fickle nature of rhetorical discourse, and for thinking of the rhetor as one who carefully sows and cultivates, and ultimately reaps the results of her or his speech acts.  Both of these depictions—rhetoric as farming, the rhetor as farmer—yield a plethora of metaphors that highlight the rich and fecund nature of language.  However, there is a third possibility available here: to focus not on the practice of farming or the persona of the farmer, but rather on the place and environment of the farm, or the rural landscape within which the pursuits of the farm and the farmer take place.  Unlike farming and the farmer, which lend themselves fairly easily to comparison to rhetoric, the rural space of the farm appears to be, as I will explain below, conceived as somewhat antithetical to the purposes and practice of rhetoric.  Thus, as the rural landscape is specifically excluded from rhetoric, it is also, through this founding exclusion, queerly installed at the heart of the history and study of rhetoric.  Rhetoric’s urban bias and emplacement in the city, then, is a queer conceit indeed.
Rhetoric vs. Rurality
The tendency to think about rhetoric through specifically urban spaces has deep roots in the history of rhetoric.  Rhetoric and democracy arose contemporaneously with the organization of people into cities and the creation of the agora as a central gathering place.  As Cicero tells it, rhetoric was responsible for the first emergence of human civilization.  Previously, humans were “wandering at random over the fields” and “hidden in habitations in the woods,” and relied only on their physical strength for survival.  But one man’s reason and eloquence induced them to assemble together, to adopt a new cooperative form of living, and to become “gentle and civilized.”  For Cicero, only the power of rhetoric could have persuaded individuals to willingly acquiesce to the will of others, to put the good of the community before individual gain, and to submit to law without violence.[1]  Thus, in Cicero’s account, as David Fleming explains, “rhetoric accounts for the origins of the city; the city, in turn, provides a function and context for rhetoric.”  That is, “historically, the art of rhetoric…and the self-governing city are closely linked; in some places and during certain periods, to think about one was essentially to think about the other. Rhetoric, in such contexts, served as the primary instrument of civic life; and the city served as the primary scene of rhetoric.”[2]
While in Cicero’s formulation the honorable, civilized life of the city is juxtaposed with the “savage and brutal” life of the countryside, the values of the urban/rural binary are often reversed.[3]  For instance, in Aristophanes’ Clouds, the action begins with Strepsiades, who comes from the country, lamenting his marriage to his urban wife, whom he characterizes as haughty and luxurious, extravagant and gluttonous, and sexually unrestrained.[4]  In contrast to Strepsiades’ simple and pure rural background, life in the city proves not only to be full of temptations for Strepsiades’ son, but also to present a much more complicated terrain of ethics for Strepsiades.  After convincing his son to study sophistry under Socrates as a means for evading his debts, Strepsiades eventually discovers the error of his ways and the danger of false arguments, and violently sets fire to Socrates’ school.  Typically read as a satirical critique of the Athenian sophistic movement, Clouds also suggests an interesting relationship between rhetoric and urban life.  Strepsiades, the representative of rural wholesomeness, is not presented as a clearly sympathetic character and therefore does not fulfill the usual role of the comedic protagonist; that is, he does not exhibit strong moral principles, he does not renew citizens’ commitments to Athenian ideals, and he does not demonstrate the solution to a social problem.[5]  Instead, his rural naïveté leaves him ill-equipped to evaluate the sophists’ tactics or to effectively guide his son, suggesting that the complexity of the ethics of city life require not sophistry, but rhetoric.  As Sluiter and Rosen put it, “life in the big city makes ethical behavior far more complicated than an agroikos would normally expect.”[6]  Difficult urban decisions, in other words, call for a more nuanced tool of analysis and persuasion; presumably, the simplicity of country life does not present the same conundrums, nor require the same rhetorical skills to navigate them.  Once again, rhetoric appears not just as a goad toward city life or an adaptation to it, but also as unnecessary for—if not actually in opposition to—rural life.
Queerness vs. Rurality
It comes as no surprise that rurality is also often understood in opposition to queer life.  That is, while the “civilized” nature of the city might accommodate queerness, if the queer strays into the rural, the result is typically imagined as tense and uncomfortable, if not actually violent.  Some queer scholars have attempted to point out such “metronormative” assumptions, arguing that they incorrectly conflate queer visibility with urban queer existence.  That is, “the metronormative narrative maps a story of migration onto the coming-out narrative,” such that the closeted subject from the country supposedly finds full self-expression of sexuality only by “coming out” into an urban community of other queers.[7]  One result of this narrative is that the rural comes to stand in as the city’s “other,” a place “out there” on which to project homophobic attitudes and behaviors, while the city maintains its status as the epicenter of liberal tolerance and progressive thinking.[8] 
Thus, when Michael Warner and Lauren Berlant theorized queer spaces through the disruption of norms of intimacy and the public/private binary, they drew their evidence primarily from Christopher Street in New York City.  And when Douglas Crimp described gay men’s sexual possibilities prior to the AIDS crisis, he centered on spaces unique to an urban environment: “back rooms, tea rooms, bookstores, movie houses, and baths; the trucks, the pier, the ramble, the dunes.”[9]  This association between the urban environment and queerness arises from an earlier belief in the iniquities of the city.  Just as Aristophanes described the temptations and wantonness of city living, mid-nineteenth century American public discourses cast homosexuality as a product of the impure conditions and degeneration of city life.  As Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson put it, “there is the assumption that homosexuality is a product of the urban, and that rural and wilderness spaces are thus somehow free from the taint of homoerotic activity.”  Wilderness spaces, parks, rural life, and physical labor were, in fact, understood as a corrective to the unhealthy influences of the urban, and the valuation of the rural went hand in hand with the condemnation of sexual “perversity.”[10]
Whether the city is figured as a queer space because of its immorality or because of its tolerance, then, queerness and rurality seem destined to be antithetical.  Just as rhetoric is defined in opposition to the rural, so too does the rural function as queerness’s founding exclusion.  But my intent is not merely to point out the parallelism of these two formulations; neither is it to assert the existence and positivities of rural rhetoric or rural queerness (claims that are at once too obvious and too complicated to pursue here).[11]  Rather, I mean to suggest that the rejection of the rural effectively guarantees its continual reinstatement as rhetoric’s queer remainder.  And the “safe and stable polis” is therefore always troubled by the rural spaces that lie outside of its civilizing influence.[12]  As I will show in the final section, it is in this imperfect exclusion of rurality that we can get a glimpse of the queer possibilities for thinking differently about rhetoric’s relationship to rurality.
Queer Rurality and Rhetoric

I began with Cicero’s account of the emergence of cities through the gentling and community-building effects of rhetoric, but his apparent dismissal of the “savage” countryside may not be the end of the story.  For example, Marcia Kmetz reads Cicero to better understand “the role of the rural citizens in the social fabric of ancient Italy” and to forward Cicero’s “redefinition of rural people and landscapes” and his “development of a rural civic ethos.”  Kmetz emphasizes that for Cicero, ethos was a communal feature, rooted not in an individual speaker, but in a place.  Defining ethos as “a habitual gathering place,” she contends “that place is a central component of character, that the physical location of the rhetorical act or the rhetor contains a character of its own that shapes communal values and the rhetor’s performance of those values.”  As such, the rural landscape in Cicero’s thought does not serve merely as a backdrop to human activities, but is instead an important and indivisible part of human interactions.  Kmetz points out that Cicero not only refers to rural people and places in most of his works and maintains his own connections to his rural origins, but that he also emphasizes the importance of the rural for its own sake, especially in the way that it “shapes its participants and defines the character of those associated with it.”[13]

            Similarly, Sheila Murnaghan examines selections from Odysseus, Hesiod, and Socrates, noting that while the farmer and the tasks of farming were marked by rusticity and a lack of sophistication, in certain circumstances speech about farming—by those who were not necessarily farmers—could confer authority on the speaker.  For example, she identifies in Hesiod’s Works and Days a series of passages that suggest a speaker’s attentiveness to the proper timing of tasks can be demonstrated through one’s observations of the natural world: the arrival of rain and frost, the locations of the stars, certain bird calls, and the emergence of new leaves.[14]  In other words, a speaker’s sensitivity to kairos might be exhibited through—indeed, might even be said to emerge from—human interactions with the natural rhythms of the rural landscape.  Further, Murnaghan characterizes the space of the farm as occupying something of a liminal zone: not quite within the purview of the city, but also distinct from the wild, unsettled, and uncultivated land that looms beyond.  The habitual occupants of this space thus have a “clear-eyed skepticism” that arises from being both insiders and outsiders (while not belonging fully to either category) and therefore may make the most trustworthy rhetors and qualified leaders.  She describes this unique perspective as “just a bit detached, just a bit off-center,” or, I might add, just a bit queer.[15]
            These admittedly brief tastes of rhetoric’s rural places is not merely a way of asserting the value of the rural in relation to the urban, but also a way of understanding the (usually unrecognized) centrality of rurality to the theorization of rhetoric.  Acknowledging the rural influences on classical rhetorical thought suggests that the exclusion of the rural serves to reinforce the dominance of the urban, and that reinvigorating our attention to the rural may begin the shake the apparent “naturalness” of the urban rhetorical model.  That is, just as heteronormativity requires queerness as its exclusion in order to consolidate the privileges of heterosexuality, metronormativity—in both queer and rhetorical scholarship—requires the rural as its rustic and devalued foil.  Importantly, the American mythos of the rural—in which the rural symbolically represents community, stability, and a truly participatory democracy—upholds the possibility for the urban model of democratic participation, even as it is devalued as old-fashioned and unsophisticated.[16]  In this sense, then, the rural functions queerly in relation to the urban in the history and theory of rhetoric.  In short, while I do not mean to posit the rural as a space of liberation or resistance, I do want to suggest that genuine attention to the place of the farm, the rural landscape, might provide a provocative means of queering the heteronormative and metronormative rhetorical tradition.



 


Works Cited

Aristophanes. Clouds. Ed. M.W. Humphreys. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2010.
Berlant, Lauren and Michael Warner. “Sex in Public.” Critical Inquiry 24 (1998): 547-66.
Carter, D.M. “At Home, Round Here, Out There: The City and Tragic Space.” In City, Countryside, and the Spatial Organization of Value in Classical Antiquity, edited by Rosen and Sluiter, 139-172. Boston: Brill, 2006.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De Inventione. Trans. C.D. Yonge. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004.
Crimp, Douglas. “Mourning and Militancy.” In Melancholia and Moralism: Essays on AIDS and Queer Politics, 129-49. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002.
Fleming, David. “The Space of Argumentation: Urban Design, Civic Discourse, and the Dream of the Good City.” Argumentation 12 (1998): 147–166.
Gray, Mary L. Out in the Country: Youth, Media, and Queer Visibility in Rural America. New York: New York University Press, 2009.
Halberstam, Judith. In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives. New York: New York University Press, 2005.
Henderson, Jeffery. Translator. “Introduction.” In Aristophanes, Clouds. Newburyport, MA: Focus Classical Library, 1993.
Kmetz, Marcia. “‘For Want of the Usual Manure’: Rural Civic Ethos in Ciceronian Rhetoric.” Rhetoric Review 30.4 (2011): 333–349.
Mortimer-Sandilands, Catriona and Erickson, Bruce, Eds. Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
Murnaghan, Sheila, “Farming, Authority, and Truth-Telling in the Greek Tradition.” In City, Countryside, and the Spatial Organization of Value in Classical Antiquity, edited by Rosen and Sluiter, 93-118. Boston: Brill, 2006.
Proctor, David E. Civic Communion: The Rhetoric of Community Building. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
Rosen, Ralph M. and Ineke Sluiter, Eds. City, Countryside, and the Spatial Organization of Value in Classical Antiquity, Boston: Brill, 2006.
---, “Introduction.” In City, Countryside, and the Spatial Organization of Value in Classical Antiquity, edited by Rosen and Sluiter, 1-12. Boston: Brill, 2006.



Notes
[1] Cicero, De Inventione, 6.
[2] Fleming, “The Space of Argumentation,” 148.
[3] Cicero, De Inventione, 6.
[4] Aristophanes, Clouds, np.
[5] Henderson, “Introduction,” 5.
[6] Sluiter and Rosen, “General Introduction,” 1.
[7] Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place, 36.
[8] Gray, Out in the Country, 9.
[9] Berlant and Warner, “Sex in Public”; Crimp, “Mourning and Militancy,” 140.  For other examples of rhetorical analyses of queer spaces that focus on urban environments, see: Thomas R. Dunn, “Remembering ‘A Great Fag’: Visualizing Public Memory and the Construction of Queer Space,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 97.4 (2011): 435-460; Kyra Pearson and Nina Maria Lozano-Reich, “Cultivating Queer Publics with an Uncivil Tongue: Queer Eye’s Critical Performances of Desire,” Text and Performance Quarterly 29.4 (2009): 383-402; Isaac West, “PISSAR’s Critically Queer and Disabled Politics,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 7.2 (2010): 156-175.
[10] Mortimer-Sandilands and Erickson, Queer Ecologies, 15.
[11] An account of the specificities of rural rhetoric can be found in, Kim Donehower, Charlotte Hogg, and Eileen E. Schell, Eds., Reclaiming the Rural: Essays on Literacy, Rhetoric, and Pedagogy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2012).  For examples of the specificities of rural queer lives, see: Mary L. Gray, Out in the Country: Youth, Media, and Queer Visibility in Rural America (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Scott Herring, Another Country: Queer Anti-Urbanism (New York: New York University Press, 2010).
[12] Carter, “At Home, Round Here, Out There,” 161.
[13] Kmetz, “‘For Want of the Usual Manure,’” 335-340.
[14] Murnaghan, “Farming, Authority, and Truth-Telling,” 104-5.
[15] Murnaghan, “Farming, Authority, and Truth-Telling,” 107, 110, 117.
[16] Proctor, Civic Communion, 17-18.

Ballif Paper



Rhetoric’s Conceit:  Farmer

A Rhetor’s Almanac and/or A Farmer’s Rhetoric
“Only the impossible can arrive”—Derrida


In what might articulate a commonplace of rhetorical studies, Thomas Cole has defined rhetoric as “a speaker’s or writer’s self-conscious manipulation of his medium with a view to ensuring his message as favorable a reception as possible on the part of the particular audience being addressed” (The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece ix).  This widely accepted definition foregrounds that traditional theorizations of rhetoric begin and end with a self-conscious rhetor who—by way of techne—can manipulate media and, by extension, audiences. Despite various critiques of such a rhetor-centered conception of rhetoric, the belief in the rhetor’s power to “seize” opportunities and to master language and audiences prevails.

Coupled with this prevailing presumption is the lore that identifies the so-called birth of rhetoric as coincidental with the birth of democracy.  Both assumptions, of course, serve a disciplinary purpose:  rhetoric must be a science, one that can be mastered by a rhetor, or it would not be teachable, and hence there would be no need for departments of rhetoric or English or communications.  And rhetoric as a discipline needs this edifying belief to obfuscate rhetoric’s complicity with instances of barbarism, capitalism, commodification, reification—and any number of forms of epistemic violence.  But there is no need to rehearse these criticisms for this group, many of whom have published books and essays on this very score.

But how might we begin, again, to retheorize rhetoric—pushing against or applying pressure on these traditional presumptions---through the conceit of the farmer?

By, I am suggesting, considering the following, related (non)points:

  The first, which I won’t address here, since I have attended to this question on so many previous occasions:  The farmer invests a great deal of energy into manure management: what to do with the remains?  That is the question that remains.

  The farmer lives a rural life, outside of the agora, the public marketplace, the public space of deliberation and commodification of knowledge, goods, and peoples. Indeed, one might say the farmer and/as rhetoric inhabits the pagus, outside of the polis.  Victor J. Vitanza’s Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric explores rhetoric and/as the pagus in provocative detail, arguing that such is theorized as a “wild/savage practice” that destabilizes the polis:  “The pagus (the savage place of ‘some more’ linkage) is a frightening place . . . of ‘affirmative desire’” (321), which is the space of “rich growth, fruitfulness, fertility; copiousness, abundance,” what exceeds the dialectical machine and repression (321), which the marketplace and citizenry of the polis depends on, with its classifications and divisions that render language and subjects “Greek” or “barbarous,” and, therefore, guarantee, politically,

what rhetorics will be heard and granted civilized status and what bodies will be protected or otherwise recognized as “human.”  Erik Doxtader writes:
As imagined and then mythologized in the name of codifying Hellenism’s homotropia, the barbarian sits at the edge of logos and the culture that it claims to sponsor. Sometimes inside and sometimes outside, the barbarian’s barbarism can mark an animal or inhuman lack of language, an incompetent, gibberish-sounding performance of language, an infelcity that corrupts language’s law and value, and an attack on language—a violence against the word wrought by an incomprehensible voice. (“Coming to Terms with a Declaration of Barbarous Acts” 119).

So in contrast to the traditionally conceived concept of rhetoric as the public art of deliberation (and the agora as the site of such deliberation), rhetoric and/as the farmer is an art of disruption—of language, of politics—that takes place in a liminal state, but most certainly not “in” the confines of the polis.

History tells us that farmers, before Agriculture with a capital “A” became a special interest group that waged significant collective power in DC, were in ancient Greece purposively isolated from the agora. According to the research of Victor Hanson, Greek literature notes that many farmers “never went into Athens at all” (The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization).  (Indeed, Hanson argues that the “countryside, not the polis proper; farmers, not urban elites; changes in agricultural practice, not pottery designs, metals, graves, urban crafts, [or] overseas trade” are the conditions of possibility for political life, for rhetoric.  In short, he argues: the philosopher-king is a symptom of the farmer.  In this way, the pagus is not seen as an aberation of the polis, but rather its very condition of possibility.

If one, then, presses this to think of a rhetoric outside of the agora, beyond the polis, one might be pressed to think of rhetoric as allegory.  Etymologically, this would mean to “speak about something else” (allos) from agoreuein (to “speak openly, speak in the assembly”) (http://www.etymonline.com/)--to speak about something else outside of the agora.

In Diane Davis’s recent work on the subject of allegory, she notes:
Allegory is not a trope, according to de Man, because it doesn’t involve a substitution in meaning, “the transport,” as Avital Ronell puts it, “of a sense from one signifier to another” (Stupidity 158). To the extent that it involves no substitution, its operations are not figural but “parafigural” and irreducible to the trope (which it also installs) of intentional consciousness. For de Man, allegory “represents one of language’s essential possibilities,” Derrida notes, “the possibility that permits language to say the other and to speak of itself while speaking of something else; the possibility of always saying something other than what it gives to be read, including the scene of reading itself.” Allegory is therefore “also what precludes any totalizing summary—the exhaustive narrative or total absorption of a memory” (Memoires 11).  Saying the other while speaking of itself or vice versa, allegory resists comprehensive appropriation. (“Autozoography: Notes on the Rhetoricity of the Living.”)

Hence, rhetoric retheorized as allegory, as “speaking otherwise,” as acknowledging rhetoric’s always already capacity to say something other than what it (purportedly) says challenges the very founding assumption of the rhetor self-consciously manipulating language and certainly challenges the assumption that a “reception” of a pre-determined message could be “guaranteed.”  Of course, Derrida had much to say on this score by way of “différance,” “dissemination,” and “destinerrance,” and the errancy of distination.  Plato, as we know—in the Phaedrus—blamed such occurances on “insensible” farmers (and insensible rhetors) who sow their seeds willy nilly (276b—277a).

Another (non)point to consider:

  The farmer’s “art” is highly dependent on a temporality that s/he cannot control. Kairos is not something that can be “seized,” as it can only be recognized—if at all, after the fact. Indeed, such “opportune moments” are dependent on rhythms of seasonality and lunar and solar movements, none of which can be determined with surety at moments requiring decisive action.  Unlike theorizations of the so-called “rhetorical situation” that suggest that the rhetorical moment can be either seized or made salient (Bitzer vs. Vatz), the farmer and/as the rhetor, acknowledges that “rhetorical” moments are as fleeting as rain forecasts and frost warnings.  The weather, like language, can be predicted but never guaranteed.  Of course, the point I’m making is that any rhetorical situation is just as volatile and unpredictable as the farmer’s situation.

Hence, the farmer has no sure knowledge: to plant or not to plant; to breed or not to breed.  Rather, the farmer acts by way of “divination,” of reading the “signs” that point to—but never guarantee—ideal conditions for growth, reproduction, harvesting. So, two points, which I’ll repeat: there is no way to know—knowledge always arrives too late, and the rhetorical “art” of the farmer is more akin to alchemy than science, more telepathy than rational deliberation. And this telepathic communication exceeds mere “human” to “human” contact:  the farmer telepathically communicates with the dirt, with the livestock, with the weather, with the moon. Of course, Farmer’s Almanacs attempt to codify this communication, render it predictable and patterned, just as Aristotle’s Rhetoric or any other handbook of communication attempts the same.  But telepathy is beyond codifiable knowledge.  Indeed, as Derrida writes in his essay of the same name: “Everything, in our concept of knowledge, is constructed so that telepathy be impossible, unthinkable, unknown. If there is any, our relation to Telepathy must not be of the family of ‘knowledge’ or ‘nonknowledge’ but of another kind” (244). Telepathy, or telepathies—in the plural, according to Nicholas Royle, introduce[s], retroactively, a force of feeling, a register of experience, over and beyond the perhaps more abstract-seeming or dry . . . language of writing, posts, and telecommunications” (“Telepathies” viii).  That is—and this is our point:
Deconstruction [what I am here calling rhetoric and/as the farmer] has to do not only with writing, regimes of representation, the postal principle, and so on, but also with feelings (“-pathies”), with the force of a thinking which reckons with an experience of presence or life as never full, haunted by

difference and deferral, interruption and interference, the unconscious, death or the entirely other, the desire and intervention of the impossible. (Royle viii)

To further quote Royle and to emphasize the untimely nature of rhetoric and/as the farmer and its anachronistic experience of temporality: “Telepathy entails strange upsets in the experience of time, in particular as regards its entanglements with fortune-telling and prophecy. It has to do, among other things, with the slippages and stallings of ‘what . . . happen[s] by the very fact of being predicted or foreseen’ [Derrida, 227]. Telepathy or telepathies will have been ‘without full presence’” (viii-ix).

“Only the impossible can arrive,” Derrida writes; and of course, it never arrives, as full presence never arrives, or at the least, one can never recognize its arrival, as it is beyond any “knowledge.”  In any event, as it were, if rhetoric and/as the farmer can disabuse itself of tidy assumptions about rhetor, message, audience, and deliberative knowledge, rhetoric and/as the farmer can retheorize itself as an art of cryptology or hermetics.  Certainly, not a practical art, but such a retheorized notion of rhetoric and/as the farmer acknowledges the impossibility of controlling time and networked forces beyond any rhetorical situation or rhetor, and invites a hospitality toward the wholly other, and at least attempts to resist its complicity with barbarism and violence.

Stormer Paper

An Appetite for Rhetoric

"But experience teaches us with abundant examples that nothing is less within men's [sic] power than to hold their tongues or control their appetites" (Spinoza 106).  Speech is effectively appetite for Spinoza and the appetites operate through affectivity.  Its important to note that an appetite for speech works with and against hunger, the master figure for appetite. The relevance of this insight to rhetorical theory might begin with the unmarked satiety of the rhetor's body: it is typically assumed to be a well fed body, or at least not a starving one. What difference could the material relation of humans to food have for rhetorical theory?
Ischomachus tells Socrates "no man [sic] ever yet persuaded himself that he could live without the staff of life" in Xenophon's Economist (loc. 1555).  So speech is not more powerful than food, and the lack of food is therefore destructive of the polis. I take this as a premise and, seeking its limit, see what is salvageable if its invalidated.  Echoing Ischomachus, farmers have been repeatedly valorized as the bringers of civilization; cultivators before culture.  Jefferson wrote to Washington that farmers were God's chosen people, since in addition to minimizing war, "husbandry begets permanent improvement, quiet life and orderly conduct, both public and private."  Emerson wrote that farming "stands nearest to God, the first cause" in that all that is good in society follows from it. I am not interested in moral improvement of the subject or wealth creation, however, but something more basic. I am interested in the farmer as pleating two appetites, hunger and speech, and where rhetoric falls relative to the fold (Deleuze).
Norman Borlaug, the great advocate of the Green Revolution, said in his Landon Lecture at Kansas State, "Food is the first basic necessity . . . When stomachs go empty, patience wears out and anger flares. If we're going to achieve world stability, it won't be done, I assure you, on

empty stomachs" (3). The first first of farming, before virtue and wealth, is food. In Spinozist terms, hunger is not affect but an affective multiplier that takes over the desire to persist in being (conatus).  Hunger unleashes a terrible vitality that seeks only its cessation; an unmet need to eat amplifies anger, leading to violence as the only possible modality or style of being.  Hunger heightens our material vulnerability to the world, including ourselves, in very narrow ways, that at the same time makes us less vulnerable to the well-heeled habits of human communication.
Starvation is a wordless rhetoric of appetite that supersedes others, an incredible motive force whose danger lies in that it undoes other strains of rhetoric that may forestall violence.
Elaine Scarry's discussion of pain resonates with me here. The hungry body, like the body in pain, becomes monadic in a particular way, folding everything in on itself and out from itself relative to the process of starvation.  Or, to the extent that rhetoric is understood as creative forces mobilized to affect, hunger is "the wild" at the heart of civility (Bennett 19), a gaunt power that both obliterates and compels other forms invention.  One might say it is necropolitical, but that is too much.  Hunger is an orientation to death, but it is not an appetite for death; it is an appetite for sustenance turned desperate.
Accordingly, in a Physiocratic rendering of the pharmakon, Francois Quesnay argued in "Natural Right," "the physical causes of physical evil are themselves the causes of physical good" (47).  Quesnay was discussing food, but the thing food addresses, hunger, is no less a pharmakon.  Hunger causes war and violence but as an appetite that we wish to prevent, it gives other appetites like speech purpose.  In the physiocrats, Jefferson, Emerson, and Borlaug, providing enough food precedes politics and economics and at the same time is the principal focus of governance, or rather hunger seems to be a radical, immanent political economy of need

that engenders civil society and which must always be tended to lest a society collapse (this also is in line with Malthusianism, and Borlaug is most certainly a neo-Malthusian).  In which case, farming becomes an inventive tekne that is at once separated from traditional linguistic strains of rhetorical practice but that invents them all the same. The appetite for speech, here broadly referencing signification, is capacitated through its fold specific to hunger.
If hunger is a pharmakon of rhetoric, a silent discourse of appetite that destroys or empowers other rhetorics as it enfolds them, then the farmer is a mediator of material ecologies for rhetoric.  Farming is an inflection point where preventive action on hunger turns toward and against the need to eat, becoming generative beyond itself as physical evil produces physical good. Agri- and aquaculture extend soil, minerals, water, plants, animals, and humans into one another in ways that increase affective power of other appetites, including "speech." As Borlaug, Jefferson, Emerson, Quesnay, and indeed Malthus assumed in some measure, when the appetite for speech is sated with the extension and improvement of agriculture, the whole of human societies are extended and improved. The farmer is a key adaptation of the will to matter and, thus, rhetoric. To paraphrase Bruno Latour, 'not all things in Rhetoric are Rhetorical.'
All this is an oblique statement that the condition for rhetoric, via conatus, is survival as opposed to creativity.  Or, rather, creativity is subordinate to and lacks purpose unless it is furthers survival, which is problematic to say the least. This is implicit in Xeonophon's Economist, made explicit in Ischumachus's assertion, and its not the first time someone has posited such an idea either (see Nietzsche's "Truth and Lies"). So here is the breakpoint.
Appetite as generative of rhetoric is not simply about a biopolitics of survival, which means the purpose of rhetoric in human community is not only the unfolding of survival. As

Elizabeth Grosz explains in her recent book Becoming Undone, conatus is about art as well. Discussing the value of Darwin for philosophy, she argues that sex selection in evolutionary theory is regularly lost in the processes of natural selection. Yet the creative forces unleashed by flowers to attract bees, for example, are in excess of reproductive utility. Sex selection, she argues, "expands the world of the living into the nonfunctional, the redundant, the artistic.  It enables matter to become more than it is, it enables the body to extend itself" (loc. 1706). Art is the "eruption of taste" within conatus and is not reducible to survival (loc. 1689).  Michael Pollan elaborates this point indirectly in Botany of Desire, tracing how apples, tulips, cannabis, and potatoes co-evolved with humans.  Food is infinitely more than sustenance and humans adapt and develop with plants and animals in complicated relations of taste, not just of practicality.
Rhetoric in a political economics like Xenophon's is affective cultivation subservient to survival; excess comes in the form of virtue and wealth from meeting basic needs well. Yet food production is one of the great pillars of creative, non-rational achievement, too (and then what of cookery, an inartful practice for Plato?). The farmer's relation to rhetoric is as a site of material creativity where multiple modes of becoming (that is multiple addressivities toward the world), adapt and create new modes of being.  Speech and hunger adapt to each other, with rhetoric materially agnostic on its proper home in either of them.  Instead, rhetoric is about creative adaptation addressed, the artfulness of becoming, which may serve survival, but maybe not.
Rhetoric's relation to persistence in being is not determined by hunger, but it does create with it and cannot finally be severed from it. The farmer, like the conceit of the legislator or lawyer or cleric, turns out to be critical for thinking about rhetoric's potential: being "of the world" we must eat  -- so that we may be "for the world" we must create (Deleuze 26).

Works Cited

Bennett, Jane. Thoreau's Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild. New ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2002. Print.

Borlaug, Norman E. Civilization Will Depend More Upon Flourishing Crops than on Flowery Rhetoric. Manhattan, KS: Kansas State University, 1979. Print.

Deleuze, Gilles. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. Trans. and intro. Tom Conley. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992. Print.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Farming. The Online Library of Liberty, n.d. Web. 1 June 2013.

Grosz, Elizabeth  Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. Kindle.

Jefferson, Thomas. "Commerce & Agriculture." Thomas Jefferson on Politics & Government.
Family Guardian, n.d. Web. 1 June 2013.

Malthus, Thomas R. An Essay on the Principles of Population. Ed. Geoffrey Gilbert. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Nietzsche, Friedrich. "On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense." Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language. Ed. and trans. Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and David J. Parent. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 246-257.

Pollan, Michael. Botany of Desire: A Plant's-Eye View of the World. New York: Random House, 2001. Kindle.

Quesnay, Francois. "Natural Right." The Economics of Physiocracy: Essays and Translations.
Ed. Ronald L. Meek. London: Routledge, 2003. 43-56. Print.

Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Print.

Spinoza, Baruch. The Ethics: Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters.
Trans. Samuel Shirley. Ed.  and intro. Seymour Feldman. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1992. Kindle.

Xenophon. The Economist. Trans. H. G. Dakyns. Amazon Digital Services, 2012. Kindle.